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1. Introduction 
1.1 Military Planners Confront an Interconnected Range of Energy Challenges 
The famous energy trilemma combines concern for energy economics and affordability 
with a desire for environmental protection and assured energy security. Addressing all three 
considerations together has proven to be a difficult challenge for energy policy makers. This 
paper deals with a separate rather specific policy issue at the interface of defense policy and 
energy policy. The domain of concern is linked to issues sometimes referred to as “Energy 
and Security” but to be clear the concern of this paper is not “Energy Security” as 
conventionally conceived. The concerns addressed in this paper do not relate directly to the 
availability of energy to serve national economies and societies rather it is the relationship 
between defense policy (including for technological innovation) and energy supply and use. 
  
The world’s militaries have for more than a hundred years taken a leadership role in terms 
on research and development (R&D) of specific technologies – especially where they are 
applicable in combat theaters. Over many decades that leadership has involved issues relating 
to energy supply and use. Recently this interest has not diminished but rather has expanded to 
bring in stronger consideration of resource efficiency and environmental impacts. In recent 
years there has been increased emphasis on the efficiency of home-country installations, and 
the development of unconventional energy projects, including renewables, for areas as 
diverse as micro-grids for installations, to alternative fuels for major weapons systems such 
as aircraft and ships. Different countries are approaching the evolving military-energy 
challenges in different ways and with different emphasis. In this paper we give emphasis to 
the policies and actions of the United States (US) given its current globally leading role in 
defense. We also consider some earlier historical British experiences. We also comment on 
the role of energy considerations in the work of the United Nations, particularly in peace-
keeping operations. 
 
When considering the recent position of the US government and military we shall tend to 
focus on the period 2009-2011. We choose this period because it represents the peak in US 
defense expenditure (Walker, 2014). As Dinah Walker has commented, US defense 
expenditure rose sharply after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 to support 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, before (as she explains), “in calendar year 2013, military 
spending declined from $671 billion to $619 billion, in constant 2011 dollars”. With a desire 
to focus on the most recent data from the period of maximum expenditure we shall frequently 
make reference to the year 2011.”   
   
The drivers for energy decision-making in the non-military sectors of the economy are 
largely economic. The energy system consists of mostly privately-owned energy assets 
interacting with public policy and regulatory frameworks to ensure economic competitiveness 
and social welfare via energy affordability, provide reliable energy services (sometimes 
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elsewhere termed “energy security”) and to achieve environmental goals in areas such as 
climate change, air pollution, and water quality.  Energy security is represented by attempts 
to reduce the negative economic impacts of supply shocks through efficiency, diversified 
supplies, and fuel choices. “Environment” is represented by state, federal and international 
efforts to minimize air, water and waste impacts associated with energy, and to encourage 
new energy sources with fewer greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In military energy 
decision-making, however, “security” takes on a different meaning more directed at 
achieving military mission and strategic objectives. The underlying economic, security and 
environmental drivers of energy decision-making exist, but the military translates and applies 
these concepts very differently. It might be said that each economic sector has its own unique 
perspective on energy issues, and while this might be true the relationship of the military to 
energy issues is special and illuminating. In the domain of defense energy has the potential to 
be both an enabler of hard power but also, via denial, arguably itself to be a weapon of war.  
 
One of the motivations for this paper has been to make clear that conventional paradigms of 
energy security (relating to economic prosperity and social harmony) should not be confused 
with the military-energy nexus (focused on the potential for hard power and willful coercion).  
  
Energy considerations have long been core to mission delivery of armed forces 
worldwide, for operations in theater, for land, air, and water transport, and for installations 
and forward operating locations. More recently the topic has again risen in light of issues 
around clean energy and new challenges facing the military (see e.g. Burke, 2017a; Burke, 
2017b; Burke, 2011; CAN, 2017; Lindner, 2017; Conger, 2017; Condliffe, 2017; Gardner, 
2017;  Pew, 2017; Pew, 2011, Glaser and Kelanic, 2017; McGinn, 2016; 
Ourenergypolicy.org, 2016; US Navy, n.d; Warrick, 2015)  Energy enables nearly everything 
the military does, and the primary objective is mission assurance and decisive advantage on 
the battlefield. So “security” is derived through energy powering capable operational major 
weapons systems and communications infrastructure at the desired levels of performance, 
range and readiness. But resupplying energy to combat theaters and the battlespace edge is a 
vulnerability, so security is also derived through minimizing the energy required for vehicles 
and forward locations. Reducing and diversifying fuel use are also the military’s drivers 
behind economic considerations. The US Department of Defense (DoD) is the world’s largest 
user of petroleum and the largest US government user of energy (USDOE, 2017), and within 
overall constrained budgets volatile energy costs represent a source of a risk to military 
operations and maintenance. Finally, defense policy makers must choose paths that 
strengthen environmental performance objectives, which in the US are driven by 
Departmental and Federal guidelines. Environmental performance also contributes to 
maintaining DoD’s social license to operate. While that social license might represent an 
engagement with host communities, it is perhaps more likely to relate to public support back 
home. One noteworthy example in this regard concerns the use of the defoliant “Agent 
Orange” in the Vietnam War. Inferred to be a cause of birth defects in Vietnam, it was back 
in the US that the story resonated as societal alienation with the war grew. 
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Military decision-making under the confluence of these security, economic and 
environmental objectives, has over decades coalesced to create a new and adaptive energy 
policy for the DoD, and hence for the United States. This confluence of objectives will 
continue to shift the technologies and strategies that will be used to power the warfighter, and 
which, in time, can be expected to shape civilian technologies. 
 
1.2 Defense and Civilian Energy  
Despite our claims for defense exceptionalism, in some scenarios, the military concerns 
of Defense and Energy can collide with the civilian concerns of Energy Security. One point 
of contact, of course, relates to energy prices as faced by defense ministries, but the 
challenges can run deeper than that. For instance, The International Energy Agency was 
established in November 1974 (Scott, 1994). As Scott explains the origins of the IEA lay in 
an economic and political crisis in the period 1973-1974. The crisis emerged from the 1973 
‘Yom Kippur’ war and the response of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OAPEC) (Scott, 1994, p. 28). OAPEC was distinct from ‘OPEC’, a broader body 
established earlier in 1960, including, for instance, Venezuela and other non-middle eastern 
states. The industrialised west had become dependent upon petroleum imports from Arab 
countries and in the face of OAPEC production cuts, prices rose dramatically.  
 
As Scott notes: “The industrial countries permitted excessive and even wasteful and 
inefficient use of energy and of oil in particular.  Energy conservation measures in those 
countries were woefully underdeveloped. Their oil production potential was not fully 
realized, nor was sufficient investment devoted to the development of other energy sources as 
alternatives to oil.  They had yet to devise a workable system for responding to serious 
disruptions in oil supply; and their organizational arrangements for co-operation could not 
enable them to cope effectively with the institutional implications of those situations.” (Scott, 
1994 p. 11) 
 
The IEA itself is based upon an international treaty: The International Energy Program 
Agreement of 1974 and amended in 1992 (Scott, 1994 p. 353). The measures included a 
legally binding oil sharing mechanism and the creation of a strong Secretariat based in Paris. 
Chapter 6 of the IEP Agreement established a ‘framework of consultation with oil 
companies’.  
 
The IEA member states are required to maintain strategic petroleum reserves among 
which the US has the largest. Formally IEA members operate their strategic petroleum 
reserves autonomously and may use their stocks for national purposes. US emergency draw-
downs from its Strategic Petroleum Reserves have historically been coordinated with the IEA 
(DOE, n.d.). The primary purpose of IEA strategic petroleum reserves is to stabilise global 
markets in times of turbulence. Coordinated release can meet market demand, in cases of 
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supply disruption and in this way reduce price volatility. Arguably such planning lies within 
the conventional paradigm of Energy Security. There is however the potential for another 
dimension to the existence of strategic energy reserves. One can easily imagine conflict 
scenarios threatening energy supply chains such that military planners might wish to husband 
strategic reserves and seek to use them to meet military energy needs. That is, strategic 
reserves might be retained specifically to ensure military access to fuel. Any such desire to 
retain stocks in the face of system stress would run directly counter to the economist’s 
preference to alleviate supply scarcity in the market.  
 
It would be incorrect to assume that the world of Energy and Defense is a full of change 
and uncertainty while the civilian concerns of Energy Security are more static and stable, not 
so very long ago US political rhetoric concerning “Energy Independence” appeared to be 
merely fanciful and populist. The revolution in natural gas production in North America 
arising from the hydraulic fracturing of shale gas deposits has in a few years utterly 
transformed the energy landscape of the United States. The US has gone from being a 
predicted major importer of liquefied natural gas to a prospective major exporter. The long-
term consequences of this shift for the word of Energy and Defense remain to be seen. Two 
important possibilities are in prospect. First, the potential creation of a free-standing global 
spot market in natural gas independent of the oil market, and second a shift in the security 
challenges of the United States in seeking to stabilize that emergent global market alongside 
an oil market of diminishing direct relevance to US interests.  
 
As regards technological development the historical role of defense related research and 
development is manifest and seen in many sectors. Civil aviation has been built upon a series 
of twentieth century military innovations, many forged in conflict. These include: gas 
turbines (jet engines), radar, cabin pressurization, de-icing, and many more. In space our 
reliance on satellite-based technologies in communications, geo-positioning and earth 
observation (e.g. weather forecasting) were all made possible by military developments in 
rocketry and space-based technologies of nuclear deterrence. In this paper, we posit a 
looming transformation in energy both military and civilian.  
 
1.3 Structure of the Paper 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly discusses historical 
energy drivers for the military and the energy impetus included in modern defense planning.  
Section 3 describes DoD operational and installation energy, and expounds on the evolving 
confluence of military energy policy. Section 4 provides conclusions and observations. While 
we will highlight the factors shaping the energy and defense agenda, we exclude from 
consideration in this paper the ways defense planning will adapt to incorporate climate 
change impacts (see, for example, DSB, 2011). Climate change impacts can be direct, such as 
changes to surface shipping routes and military logistics or affecting military installations 
(DoD, 2015), but could also be indirect, such as increasing regional pressures on natural 
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resources and potentially motivating conflict (DoD, 2015; White House, 2015).  We and 
others will examine aspects of such matters in future work, but at this point we simply concur 
with Leon Fuerth when he observes; 
 
“In the realm of military thinking, it is standard practice to consider worst-case scenarios 
as a way to avoid settling on insufficiently robust courses of action. Also in military 
thinking, it is standard to pay serious attention to low-probability, high-damage events 
(e.g. nuclear war). Where climate change is concerned, however, our thinking tends 
toward best-case outcomes, for no real reason other than the inconvenience of the 
possible truth. Planning for climate change needs to shift toward worst-case scenarios, 
especially because trends in the physical evidence are all pointing in that direction.”  
(Fuerth, 2013) 
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2. The Past and Present of Energy’s Role in Defense Planning 
Historical Linkage of War and Energy 
Energy has played a role in every facet of war from troops in garrison and defensive 
planning to mobilization and attack. The need to deliver adequate and timely energy supplies 
to military forces—particularly to those in the most forward-deployed locations—has long 
existed as a strategic vulnerability to the success of military campaigns. Targeting materiel 
supply channels in an effort to hamstring adversaries’ operational strength has often been 
employed as an effective tactical strategy. In addition, the logistics to deliver a reliable 
energy supply has been a recurring theme in the story of both successful and unsuccessful 
military operations (DoD, 2011).  
 
Many of the lessons learned during the world wars of the 20th century are still being 
appreciated and relearned in today’s conflicts. One of the most famous examples of energy 
influencing military strategy comes from 1911, when Winston Churchill, then First Lord of 
the Admiralty, converted the British fleet from Welsh coal to foreign oil. The resulting gain 
in speed and decrease in logistical burden gave the British Royal Navy a critical advantage 
over the Axis powers (Crowley, 2007).  The action proved decisive and enabled the allied 
power to “float to victory on a sea of oil” (Nemetz, 1979). The policy brought with it further 
advantage as the less smoky combustion of oil allowed the Royal Navy to avoid producing 
the tell-tale plume of dark coal smoke that could so easily reveal a fleet’s position (Dahl, 
2000).  
 
While the shift from coal to oil was a decisive one for Winston Churchill and for the 
Royal Navy, the history of the First World War further reveals its status as the first major 
conflict fought, in part for energy. British strategy, reinforced by the Battle of Jutland (May 
31st to June 1st 1916), relied on a blockade denying Germany and her allies access to global 
supply chains including most notably food, but also oil and other industrial resources. Even 
before the war, there had been a competition for access to Persian Gulf oil with, on the one 
hand Germany seeking to establish a Berlin to Baghdad railway, and on the other Britain 
establishing commercial oil operations in the region, among which Anglo-Persian Petroleum 
was the most prominent (Engdahl, 2007). During the war access to oil became a pressing 
concern for both sides indeed. According to Paul (2002) Secretary to the British War Cabinet 
Sir Maurice Hankey went so far as to say about Mesopotamian oil that “Control of these oil 
supplies becomes a first-class war aim”. Following victory, Britain and France initially 
divided access to all Mesopotamian oil between them, but then the British out-maneuvered 
France going into the Versailles peace conference and secured exclusive access to 
Mesopotamian oil via a new League of Nations protectorate called Iraq (Engdahl, 2007, Paul, 
2002)).   
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Throughout the First World War, in parallel to British developments, the shift from coal 
to oil was also underway in the smaller United States Navy, but running on domestic oil 
(primarily from Oklahoma, Texas and California) (AOGHS, nd). 
 
As the militaries of the world shifted during the early twentieth century toward oil as the 
main energy source, energy security and geopolitical positioning became important planning 
and operational variables. The resulting scramble to secure oil supplies heavily influenced 
events leading to and throughout WWII. Some of the greatest military strategic decisions in 
World War II had their roots in a desire to access energy resources. Operation Barbarossa – 
Nazi Germany’s failed invasion of Russia (June-December 1941) is frequently presented as 
an attempt by Hitler to access Soviet oil resources. Germany captured the Maikop oil field in 
November 1942, but was overstretched and lacked the equipment to bring the field back into 
production (Hayward, 2000). The Germans military’s perceived need for oil created a two-
front war and their failure to take and hold the oil fields spelled disaster at Stalingrad and 
changed the tide on the eastern front (Yergin, 1991). 
 
In the Asia-Pacific theater, the need for oil and other recourses shaped Japanese military 
and foreign policy both before and during the war. Much like the surprise attacks in operation 
Barbarossa, the Japanese surprised the American naval fleet on December 7, 1941 in an 
attempt to secure oil shipping lanes (Yergin, 1991, Roll, 2013). Previously, at the initiative of 
US Secretary of State Dean Acheson the US had effectively blocked oil exports to Japan in 
July 1941 following Japan’s invasion of French Indochina which in turn had followed 
Germany’s defeat of France in Europe. Fearing that any mitigating response would prompt 
conflict Japan decided to act aggressively and near simultaneously attacked Pearl Harbor in 
the Central Pacific, on Hong Kong and Malaya (Roll, 2013). These attacks were at the heart 
of a Japanese strategy to secure oil and other natural resources, such as rubber, from South 
East Asia1. Indeed Japan used the term “Southern Resource Area” to describe its sphere of 
wider influence and its economic hinterland (Mackenzie, 1997), while true vassal states 
joined the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. As such, Japan’s assertion that it was 
ridding the region of European colonial rule surely had a rather hollow ring.   
 
Energy’s link to conflict in WWII had as much to do with the denial of resources to the 
enemy as it did to securing one’s own oil supply chains. The stalling of General Patton’s 
Third Army following its campaign across France in August and September 1944 is a telling 
example of fuel acting as a “tether” to military operations (Decker, 2003). At the time, 
Patton’s army was over 100 miles closer to Berlin than any other Allied army. While Patton 
had the advantage on the battlefield, he the disadvantage of being tethered to an energy 
source located hundreds of miles away. Years later, in 1970, the famous war strategist, Sir 
                                                 
1 As an interesting aside, the oil insecurity affecting the Japanese was the result of a demand of around 30 
million barrels per year (Maechling, 2000), in recent years, the US military has been completing fuel shipments 
into war zones (Iraq and Afghanistan) of around 60-70 Million barrels per month. 
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Basil Hart, described the delay as the “unforgiving minute” and that the “best chance for a 
quick finish”, to the war, “was probably lost when the gas was turned off on Patton’s tanks.” 
(Yergin 1991).  
 
While the skill of logistics forces in providing fuel has grown significantly since World 
War II, many leaders in the military are mindful of the operational implications of fuel’s 
logistical requirements. General James N. Mattis has highlighted the enduring criticality of 
logistics—energy logistics in particular—when he echoed the call of General Patton and 
entreated the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to “unleash us from the tether of fuel” as a 
result of his experience leading U.S. Marines into Iraq in 2003 (Fenwick, 2009). More 
recently, a test deployment in 2010 of portable solar-powered generation systems at U.S. 
Marine forward operating bases in Afghanistan have reduced the bases’ diesel generator 
usage by more than 90%—virtually eliminating the need for risky and costly fuel convoys to 
keep these bases supplied with energy (Daniel, 2011).  
 
To summarize: the twentieth century saw energy figure ever more centrally as a driver of 
conflict, a strategic factor and a tactical consideration in war. The trend extended through the 
end of the Twentieth Century. For example, the energy intensity of war fighting grew by a 
factor of 16 and the oil-intensity of the individual soldier rose 2.6% annually from 1970-2010 
(Lovins, 2010). This military evolution and decades of technological innovation has, until 
very recently, done nothing to reduce the mission-criticality of fuel supplies. For this reason, 
it has become an important area of research, development and defense planning. 
Energy and Modern Defense Planning 
There is a vast and evolving literature on energy security as seen from the perspective of 
civilian energy policy-makers the framing of such considerations, and frequently gives 
emphasis to the concerns of energy economics and involves notions of security of supply and 
security of demand for those involved in energy-based trade. In this paper we focus on a 
different set of considerations termed “Energy and Defense”. We invoke the term Energy and 
Defense for those instances where energy is directly related to armed conflict, the threat of 
such conflict, or in the clear confines of foreign diplomacy. In the Twentieth Century, this 
was primarily associated with the global oil sector or the use of fossil fuels for troop 
movements, although the story of the use of nuclear energy for submarine warfare and naval 
nuclear deterrence is arguably another fascinating example of defence-energy synergies. The 
enormous energy density of nuclear fuel made possible the strategic doctrine of Continuous 
At Sea Deterrence (CASD) in which Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear (SSBN) submarines 
hide in deep blue water awaiting orders from the Commander in Chief to move to launch 
depth and annihilate the enemy. The nuclear reactor made possible the ultimate second strike 
nuclear weapons system able to deliver massive retaliation consistent with either counter-
force or counter-value goals. Meanwhile ranged against every SSBN force are a set of 
nuclear powered attack submarines designed to neutralise an enemy deterrent early in a 
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conflict. Arguably this whole defence enterprise was enabled by an energy technological 
innovation – the controlled nuclear fission reactor.  
 
2.1.1 Geostrategic Risk 
 
The need to secure oil supplies and to maintain the stability of world oil markets has 
played a major role in shaping U.S. foreign policy and dictating U.S. military strategy and 
deployment (Crane et al. 2009; Deutch et al. 2006 CFR Task Force report). While DoD’s 
own petroleum demand is a relatively small portion of US petroleum needs, it experiences a 
unique feedback loop in adding to the energy and defense concerns that arguably have part-
motivated U.S. military action in the first place. 
 
2.1.2 Increased Dependence 
The international, US-led, operations in Iraq (since 2003) and Afghanistan (since 2001) have 
illuminated the increased cost and intensity of energy use in modern theaters of conflict. In 
World War II, the United States consumed about a gallon of fuel per soldier per day, in the 
1990-91 Persian Gulf War, about 4 gallons of fuel per soldier was consumed per day. In 
2006, the US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan burned about 16 gallons of fuel per soldier 
on average per day, almost twice as much as the year before (Crowley et al. 2007).  
2.2 Energy and Defense - the role of the United Nations 
The United Nations (UN) has had a leading role in attempting to mitigate harmful climate 
change caused by human activities. In Rio di Janeiro Brazil in 1992, the UN created the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, which was followed in 1997 in the Japanese city 
of Kyoto by The Kyoto Protocol. The intention of the Convention (UNFCCC, 1992) was that 
major developed industrial countries would lead the way in emissions reduction. Developing 
countries, most notably China, were exempt from any obligation to limit or reduce emissions 
and the United States, although a signatory to the Convention never ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol. While one might argue that global emissions are lower than they would have been 
in the absence of the Convention, the Protocol and UN concern generally, it is clear that this 
high-profile UN initiative has so far failed to live up to the early expectations of its 
proponents.  
 
Global environmental protection was not a founding mission of the UN. Conflict 
prevention motivated and shaped the UN. It was conceived by the Allied Powers in 1942 in 
the depths of World War II in a Declaration by United Nations (UN, 1942). The UN charter 
reveals an ongoing focus on international peace and security (UN, nd). It is in UN work to 
support the core function of peace keeping that one can find tangible examples of 
environmental progress.  
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2.2.1 UN Peacekeeping  
  UN Peacekeeping is noteworthy for the explicit policy consideration given to the 
minimization of negative environmental impacts. While military forces devoted to war 
fighting must necessarily prioritize narrow military objectives the special focus of 
peacekeeping operations permits, and arguably even requires, a different balance of priorities 
in what is fundamentally a military enterprise. 
 
UN peacekeeping operations consist of around 115,000 staff in 16 countries (end of 2012) 
and represent 55% of the emissions of the entire UN system (UNEP, 2012a). The largest 
share of emissions for peacekeeping operations is due to air travel (46%), followed by power 
generation (26%) and road vehicles (15%). Until recently, the decisions regarding the 
adoption of renewable energy sources and of energy efficiency measures were handled at the 
single mission level, lacking any general UN-wide policy in the area, despite the potential for 
cost-savings (UNEP, 2012b, p. 27). 
 
In recent years however the UN started a policy of reduction of its environmental impact 
in all of its operation, including its energy consumption for the field missions, and to pursue 
also other environmental goals following the spirit and the indications of the Seventh 
Millennium Development Goal (MDG7) to ensure environmental sustainability. In fact, since 
2009 two new instruments have been adopted: the first is the Environmental Policy for the 
UN Field Missions, adopted by the Department of Peace Keeping Operations DPKO and by 
the Department of Field Operations DFO, the second is a Global Field Support Strategy 
adopted by the General Assembly (UN, 2010) (UNEP, 2012b). These policies are mandatory 
and regard many areas of environmental sustainability of peacekeeping operations, including 
camp management issues like the use of water, wastewater, solid and hazardous waste, 
wildlife, and energy. The adoption of the new policies is meant to provide minimum 
environmental standards and operational guidance for all field missions.  
 
In its 2012 report Greening the Blue Helmets UNEP affirms that one obstacle to the 
adoption of energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies in the field is that the field 
mission’s length is often unknown in advance and consequently a future-oriented cost-benefit 
analysis of renewable technologies becomes difficult (UN, 2012). In many cases the 
technologies to be deployed are chosen on the base of the initial length of the mission, 
typically six to twelve months, while the average length of a mission is far longer, typically 
seven years. Experience from the implementation in UN peacekeeping operation of 
sustainable energy and energy efficiency measures points to a cost-recovery payback time of 
one to five years (UN, 2012). The benefits that surely exist are being missed as a result of an 
excessively short-term mindset in project planning and approvals. Part of the solution must be 
to allow for time horizons to be considered for cost benefit analysis that exceed the 
authorisation period of the mission in question at the time of assessment.  
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The UNEP Greening the Blue Helmets report reveals that there have been some 
successful cases of sustainable energy intervention in UN peacekeeping operations. As an 
example, in Timor-Leste UNMIT has established an environmental committee that monitors 
energy use and adopted energy efficiency measures, including staff practices, and the use of 
solar energy for isolated applications. These practices led to a saving of around 335,000 USD 
per year. In Lebanon UNIFIL has implemented the UN’s 2009 policies: putting in place 
environmental guidelines and an action plan for the mission, and a complete Environmental 
Management System (EMS) that manages all environmental related aspects of the mission. 
The measures adopted include the introduction of efficient transport vehicles, efficient 
electricity generators and building chillers, and the implementation of solar PV generation. In 
Darfur UNAMID forces have helped local women with their energy needs and security, 
escorting them regularly when collecting wood for fuel outside the camp, and also 
introducing modern cook-stoves reducing the consumption of firewood up to 80%. These 
measures greatly reduced the risks of assault and violence for the women, particularly during 
the agricultural cultivation season.  
 
Notwithstanding these cases, UNEP notes also that the new policy guidelines are still to 
demonstrate sufficient results on the ground, and UNEP further stresses the importance of an 
initial focus on training, monitoring and reporting activities and of the creation of an 
Environmental Baseline Studies and of Environmental Impact Assessments for field 
missions. Furthermore UNEP suggests that a dedicated environmental officer should be 
appointed to each mission and that this person should report directly to senior level staff. 
 
The extent to which UN concern for environmental impacts in peacekeeping is linked to 
the role of the organization is attempting to enhance global sustainability and a low-carbon 
future can be debated, but it seems clear that the desire to be seen to lead by example is 
underpinning actions by the UN to reduce the harmful environmental impacts of its own 
activities.   
 
2.2.2 Energy and Defense in a Military Alliance - NATO 
The NATO approach to energy issues is taken through an Energy and Defense lens, both 
for its member countries and of its operations. NATO debated its approach to ‘energy 
security’ in 2006, and convened this theme to be of central importance for the alliance and 
further mandated its member countries to define its role2  (Shea, 2006) (Gallis, 2007) 
(Monaghan, 2008) (NATO, 2006, para. 45). One of the consequences of this decision is that, 
in October 2012, a NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence was founded in Lithuania 
                                                 
2 Article 45 of the NATO Riga declaration in 2006 states that: “As underscored in NATO’s Strategic Concept, Alliance 
security interests can also be affected by the disruption of the flow of vital resources.  We support a coordinated, 
international effort to assess risks to energy infrastructures and to promote energy infrastructure security.  With this in 
mind, we direct the Council in Permanent Session to consult on the most immediate risks in the field of energy security, in 
order to define those areas where NATO may add value to safeguard the security interests of the Allies and, upon request, 
assist national and international efforts.” 
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(NATO ENSEC COE). The Centre will join the family of the other NATO COE and will  
provide 1) strategic analysis and research; 2) development of doctrine, standards and 
procedures; 3) education, training and exercise and 4) consultations (NATO ENSEC COE, 
2012). Some work in this area has already started, in particular NATO members are 
collaborating to exchange smart energy solutions to reduce fossil fuel consumption in their 
respective militaries, and reduce the threat to the environment (NATO, 2012a).  
 
The problem of fuel consumption and of the security of fuel supplies has particularly 
affected the biggest NATO operation ever, in Afghanistan. In late 2012 ISAF forces 
amounted to more than one hundred thousand troops consuming every day more than 1.8 
million gallons of fuel (6.8 million litres), 99% of which delivered by truck from abroad. The 
fuel used to transit through Pakistan but, after an air attack that accidentally killed 24 
Pakistani soldiers in 2011, the border was closed by the Pakistan government and NATO 
forces were forced to shift all the supply of energy to the North, through the so-called 
Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a rail link of more than 5,000 km starting from 
Latvia, traversing Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan until the city of Termez, where trains 
are offloaded and the fuel is moved to trucks that cross the border to Afghanistan3. It should 
not have come as a surprise when Foreign Policy described this logistic as  a “nightmare”. 
(Trilling, 2011) (Kinaci, 2012) (NATO, 2012b). 
 
It is clear that the long-standing vulnerabilities and difficulties of fuel logistics seen in 
World War I and World War II are so far undiminished despite enormous progress in military 
technology. In fact in some aspects, these vulnerabilities have grown as the energy intensity 
of conflict has increased. 
 
 
  
                                                 
3 Another route of the NDN bypasses Russia, starting with the Georgian port of Poti, and goods travel through Azerbaijan, 
the Caspian Sea, Kazakhstan and still reach Afghanistan through the Termez bottleneck in Uzbekistan. 
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2.3 Positing the Prospect of a Future Revolution in Military Affairs 
As in previous conflicts, the U.S. military has used technologies and strategies to adapt to 
the new challenges experienced in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The rapid increase in use 
of remotely piloted aircraft (aka “drones”) in these theaters signaled a realization of the 
“revolution in military affairs” that drones represented (see, for example, DoD, 1997; 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997; Hundley 1999). A revolution in military affairs, or RMA, 
“involves a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations” (Hundley, 1999). 
The literature cites many past examples of RMAs that have changed warfare, including 
precision strike munitions, nuclear weapons, the aircraft carrier, radar, and even the English-
developed longbow from the thirteenth century. RMAs can be technological, but can also 
result from the emergence of new strategies, doctrine and decision-making (Hundley, 1999). 
In this chapter, we argue that the new ways that the military plans for, uses and manages 
energy could represent a future RMA that could transform DoD acquisitions and operations, 
and enhances the capabilities of the fighting force. In this way, the military would break free 
of the risks and difficulties seen in conflicts over at least the last 100 years.  
 
As we have seen, resupplying energy to combat vehicles and the warfighter has long been 
a vulnerability and area of desired improvements by the military. Throughout the military 
literature, there has long been a desire of enhancing the ratio of the fighting “tooth” of the 
military to the supporting “tail” (see, for example, McGrath, 2007; DSB, 2001; DSB, 2008). 
The size and requirements of the tooth of the fighting force directly affect the size and 
requirements of the resupplying tail. For example, when combat vehicles and warfighters 
deploy to theaters, they require additional vehicles and personnel as combat support elements 
(such as medical, supplies and other needs), and these combat support elements, themselves 
require resupply from other combat service support elements along the tail. This results in 
cascading vehicle, personnel and supply requirements from the tooth the tail. In World War 
II, average fuel demand per soldier was about 1 gallon per day. This has increased to 15 to 20 
gallons per solider in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom (Vane and 
Roege, 2011). The long-standing challenges of fuel logistics are undiminished and arguably 
becoming worse. The vulnerability of such supply lines was exploited by Afghan fighters, 
and contributed to about one U.S. Marine Corps casualty for every fifty convoys in 
Afghanistan (DoD, 2013 factsheet). A separate estimate (AEPI, 2009) distinguished FY2007 
Army solider and civilian casualties by energy and water convoys. In Iraq, the Army study 
found 1 casualty for every 39 fuel convoys and every 63 water convoys. For, Afghanistan the 
casualty factors were higher- 1 casualty for every 24 fuel convoys and every 29 water 
convoys (AEPI, 2009). These casualties incurred during resupply have intensified DoD’s 
efforts to reduce this strategic security vulnerability. Reducing energy and water requirements 
for the fighting tooth represents a significant and realizable opportunity to shift the 
fundamental tooth-to-tail ratio in the Armed Services. 
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Over the past decade, two other factors have shaped military energy decision-making. 
The first is the increased focus on the costs of military energy. In FY 2011, DoD consumed 
890 trillion British thermal units (Btu) of energy, roughly 1% of U.S. energy consumption 
and 80% of U.S. federal energy consumption (EIA, 2012), at a cost of $19.3 billion (DoD, 
2012 AEMR). DoD spent approximately 90 percent of these FY2011 energy costs on 
petroleum products. In FY2011, DoD consumed roughly 117 million barrels of petroleum 
(Schwartz et al., 2012), approximately 2% of total U.S. petroleum consumption in 2011 
(analysis using EIA 2012). In FY 2011, jet fuel alone accounted for nearly 60% of total DoD 
energy consumption, while all petroleum-based fuels supplied about 80% (EIA 2012). 
Despite a 4% decrease in DoD’s petroleum consumption between FY 2005 and FY 2011, the 
agency’s petroleum expenditures over the same period rose 381% in real terms due to rising 
oil prices (Schwartz et al., 2012). While still a relatively small portion of DoD’s total 
spending (2.5% in FY 2011), the $17.3 billion spent on fuel in FY 2011 is large in absolute 
terms. Since 1990, the DoD’s cost of buying fuel has increased faster than health care, 
personnel and every other major DoD budget category (Schwartz et al., 2012). Additionally, 
petroleum price volatility has negatively impacted DoD operating budgets and created large 
unfunded obligations (Schwartz et al., 2012). 
 
The second other factor affecting military energy decision-making is the requirement for 
the DoD to improve energy efficiency, use renewable energy, and energy management as 
directed through several legislative and executive actions. From the National Energy 
Conservation Policy Act enacted in 1978 to the Energy Independence and Security Act of 
2007, the Executive Order 13514 signed in 2009, a bevy of federal mandates have sought to 
demonstrate the federal government’s own leadership in fostering sustainability and reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions by setting aggressive goals for federal agencies. These goals are 
aimed at reducing water and energy intensity and petroleum consumption, and at increasing 
the use of renewable, efficient, and alternative energy technologies. These goals and 
mandates range from requirements to develop and implement energy and water management 
strategies; efficiency standards for acquisition of new energy-consuming products, 
equipment, and vehicles; and percentage targets for the use of renewable energy-generated 
electricity. Additionally, several of the annual National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) 
that funds the Department of Defense have included language that affects energy use in 
weapons platforms as well as on installations.  
 
It is clear that the dependence of US military operations of extended and vulnerable fuel 
supplies is unsustainable at many levels. A Revolution in Military Affairs is needed and can 
be expected whereby innovative technology in energy supply and use will reduce, or 
eliminate, the need for extended full supply lines. This technological innovation will be 
driven by defense policy and military needs and as such will be largely independent of 
measures to promote energy technology in the civilian sector. The consequences for civilian 
energy supply and use arising from defense innovation could, however, be significant.  
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2.4  US Trajectory in Operational Military Energy Decision-Making 
 
In FY 2011, DoD consumed roughly 650 trillion Btu of operational energy, of which the 
vast majority was supplied from petroleum-based fuels (analysis based on AEMR 2012).  
Estimates for DoD petroleum expenditures in FY 2011 range from $15-$17 billion (AEMR 
2012, CRS 2012). The Air Force consumed the most petroleum (53% in FY 2011), followed 
by the Department of the Navy (28%), including the Marine Corps, and the Army (18%).  All 
other DoD agencies accounted for the remaining 1% (CRS 2012). 
 
The DoD separates energy consumption along the lines of facility (or installation) and 
operational energy, since they possess distinct characteristics, priorities, and opportunities. 
Facility energy is consumed at fixed installations and by non-tactical vehicles (DoD, 2012). 
Operational energy is defined in law as “the energy required for training, moving, and 
sustaining military forces and weapons platforms for military operations.” (US Code, 2011) 
Although some ambiguity exists in the delineation between these two categories, DoD’s FY 
20114 energy consumption was roughly 74% operational energy and 26% installation energy 
(DoD, 2012). The proportion of operational to installation use depends greatly on the current 
level of military activities. High levels of operational use in recent years reflect U.S. 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (Schwartz et al., 2012). 
 
Bak (2011) identified operational energy processes and levers DoD can influence, 
including: 
• Force Planning Assumptions and Defense Planning Scenarios 
• Requirements Development 
• Acquisition Programs and Rapid Fielding 
• Technology Priorities and Investments 
• Culture, Measurement, Education and Billing 
 
Petroleum-based fuels dominate DoD’s energy mix. DoD’s petroleum consumption (and 
especially its volume, disproportionately growing cost, and additive effect to geostrategic 
risks) has been widely discussed as one of the agency’s most critical energy issues (see e.g. 
Defense Task Board reports 2001, 2008, CRS report 2012, Lovins 2010).  
 
The central role of petroleum products in DoD’s energy mix is one of the most salient 
reasons why a large portion of ongoing efforts have focused on reducing DoD’s use of 
petroleum through conservation, increased efficiency, and development and deployment of 
alternative fuel substitutes and technologies. 
 
                                                 
4 U.S. DoD’s Fiscal Year 2011 is from October 1, 2010 to September 30, 2012. 
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The US Defense Logistics Agency - Energy (DLA-E), formerly called the Defense 
Energy Support Center (DESC)5, is responsible for supporting the energy needs of DOD’s 
combat operations, which includes the wholesale purchase, storage, and sale of fuels to DoD 
and other government agencies (DLA-E, 2014). 
 
For operational energy use, the commodity cost of fuels purchased by DoD from DLA-E 
is often only a fraction of the total costs of energy for operational use. Significant indirect 
costs can be incurred by the logistical operations needed to transport and protect these fuel 
supplies from DLA-E supply points to DOE operational theaters, particularly when these 
theaters are in remote or politically unstable regions of the world.  The “fully burdened cost 
of fuel” (FBCF), as it is called, varies widely depending on the location and distance of the 
transport operation and, especially, on the amount of force protection needed to guard the fuel 
supply convoys.6  Schwartz et al. (CRS, 2012) provide a number of FBCF estimates collected 
from studies conducted by DoD Armed Forces: 
 
“In 2010, the Marine Corps estimated the fully burdened cost of fuel in Afghanistan at 
between $9 to $16 per gallon if delivered by land, and between $29 to $31 per gallon if 
delivered by air. An Army study estimated the fully burdened cost of fuel in Iraq at $9 to $45 
per gallon, depending on the type of force protection used to and the delivery distance, while 
an Air Force study estimated the fully burdened cost of fuel delivered by land at $3 to $5 per 
gallon and $35 to $40 per gallon for aerial refueling. A 2008 report by the Army 
Environmental Policy Institute estimated that the fully burdened cost of fuel for a Stryker 
brigade in Iraq ranged from $14.13 to $17.44 per gallon.” 
 
With fully burdened costs at this level we start to see one of the key reasons for the 
defense arena to be a key driver of technological innovation in energy systems. An economic 
case for new and initially at least, relatively high cost alternatives can be made much more 
easily in a defense context than in the lower cost world of civilian energy policy and markets.  
 
Several industry and government reports (see e.g. DTB, 2001; LMI, 2007; etc.) identified 
a critical need for DoD to develop measures to assess the indirect energy costs of 
technologies and systems, and to incorporate these measures into operational planning and 
acquisition processes. In doing so, DoD would be able to compare options on the basis of 
                                                 
5
 From 2004 through 2008, the cost of DESC purchases from its supply network increased from $5.9 billion to 
$18.1 billion, a significant jump due almost entirely to increases in fuel prices. Over the same period, DESC 
sales to its customers increased from $6.9 billion to $18.7 billion. The DoD is overwhelmingly the DESC’s 
largest customer, although the DESC sells a small amount of energy resources to non-DoD governmental 
agencies, as well as to foreign governments. (Delloite, 2011) 
6
 This is quantified in a report completed by the US Army - 
http://www.aepi.army.mil/docs/whatsnew/SMP_Casualty_Cost_Factors_Final1-09.pdf - in the analysis 
casualties are measured and projected against fuel use. The study concludes that water and fuel delivery 
accounted for 10-12% of historic casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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their energy performance and efficiency, along with other traditional factors, and make 
superior strategic acquisition, deployment, and R&D investment decisions. 
 
However, it wasn’t until 2007 that a policy memo published by the Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology, and Logistics (OSD (AT&L)) initiated 
the incorporation of fully burdened costs of energy considerations into acquisition decisions 
for three pilot programs.  Following that, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA) for FY 2009, the military budget authorization bill passed by Congress in 2008, 
required the fully burdened cost of fuel and energy efficiency to be considered in planning, 
capability requirements development, and acquisitions processes. 
 
With analytical guidance from the Defense Science Board’s 2001 report, More Capable 
Warfighting Through Reduced Fuel Burden, the OSD (AT&L) and the Office of Cost 
Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) (formerly the Office of Program Analysis and 
Evaluation) have led the way by developing and refining guidelines for a prototype FBCF 
methodology.  These guidelines have been incorporated into the Defense Acquisitions 
Guidebook, the DoD reference guide of best practices for acquisitions. Within the last few 
years, the Armed Forces branches have adapted the OSD (AT&L)/CAPE methodology for 
their own use or developed similar methodologies. 
 
Notions of cost minimization and economic efficiency are attractive to all defense 
ministries, but acceptance of new more efficient technologies and practices by military 
personnel rely largely on a different logic. Recent asymmetric conflicts such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan have relied upon extended and vulnerable supply chains. This combines with the 
real and perceived isolation of forward operating bases to yield a sense among soldiers that 
they would prefer any approach that would reduce the need for fuel re-supply. Re-supply 
risks soldiers’ lives and the lives of support workers in ways that would be avoided if more 
energy efficient systems were deployed. For the soldiers at the front the need for frequent re-
supply represents a vulnerability that they would prefer to live without. 
 
The analysis of alternative energy integration in the military found a focus in four areas of 
development: 
 
• The area of liquid fuels continues to be an area of focus and vast potential. Most 
of the innovation in the area has involved the air force’s implementation of biofuel 
mixes. While there is skepticism regard the economics of this work, the continued 
implementation and development of mixed fuel technologies has been ensured by 
legislation (Wall Street Journal, 2012). 
 
• Away from the front, military installations have received focus for the energy and 
cost saving potentials of efficiency and renewable energy systems. One estimate 
found that shifting from reliance on diesel backup generators to advanced 
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microgrids at installations could save the DoD between $8 billion and $20 billion 
over the next 20 years (Navigant, 2017). The cost savings from these upgrades can 
be better used to finance the needs at the front. 
 
• The use of small scale systems at the platoon/company level will continue to be 
developed and utilized as military leaders strive to provide small scale fighting 
forces independence from their fuel tether.  
 
• The imperative of maintaining power independence in forward operating bases 
has created demand for innovative systems. The described difficulties of 
supplying fuel to generators have led to a number of unique efficiency 
modifications. This system has allowed for the development of more efficient 
microgrids for electrical power distribution on military bases and installations. 
These installations combine the smart information technology (IT) and 
environmental benefits seen in civilian equivalents together with enhanced IT 
security and with a strong emphasis on reduced fuel needs. Technological 
leadership in this space comes from US activity.   
 
The growing momentum within DoD and Congress to take action regarding increasingly 
burdensome fuel logistics led to the establishment in 2010 of a new Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs (ASD (OEPP)).  The office was charged 
with developing DoD’s first operational energy strategy and providing oversight and 
guidance to DoD agencies on operational energy. In 2011, the office released the Operational 
Energy Strategy: Energy for the Warfighter, followed by the companion Operational Energy 
Strategy: Implementation Plan in 2012.  The report outlined three strategic goals: 
 
• More fight, less fuel: reduce energy demand and increase energy efficiency 
• More options, less risk: diversify energy sources and reduce dependence on external 
energy infrastructure, particularly the U.S. commercial electricity grid 
• More capability, less cost: incorporate energy considerations into DoD institutions 
and processes, particularly for planning and acquisitions 
 
The unique energy perspective of the military is also relevant in how technologies are 
shared amongst allied forces. Through foreign military sales, joint exercises and international 
basing, DOD can promote adoption of shared technical standards and directly influence the 
energy systems used by its allies (Parthemore, Nagl, 2010). The sharing of research and 
development and the constant push for standardization could lead to the proliferation of 
energy alternatives to allied countries where the process of military technology pathways to 
commercial use can take place. 
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2.5 Energy Decision-Making for Military Installations 
In FY 2011, DoD consumed 224 trillion Btu of installation energy at a cost of $4.1 billion 
(DOD, 2012). Buildings accounted for 95% of consumption, while non-tactical vehicles 
made up 5% (DOD, 2012). Electricity and natural gas supplied the majority of installation 
energy (48% and 32%, respectively) (DOD, 2012), which is roughly analogous to the U.S. 
commercial sector’s energy mix of 52% electricity and 38% natural gas in 2011(EIA, 2012) 
Worldwide, DoD manages more than 500 installations with around 300,000 buildings 
(AEMR, 2011). The Army consumed the most installation energy (36% in FY 2011), 
followed by the Air Force (30%), and the Department of the Navy (28%), including the 
Marine Corps (DOD, 2012). All other DoD agencies accounted for the remaining 6%.  
 
One of Former President Obama’s first energy acts was enacting Executive Order 13514 
on Federal Sustainability. By signing the act, the President made the government’s “goal [to] 
lower costs, reduce pollution, and shift Federal energy expenses away from oil and towards 
local, clean energy” (White House, 2010). The US Federal Governments internal goal of 28% 
reduction in GHG by 2020 has created greater emphasis within departments (DoD/DOE) to 
reduce fuel use and permitted much energy technology research and development using 
federal resources. Here there are linkages to long-standing critiques from Europe that while 
the US tends to avoid political discourse on the themes of industrial strategy or industrial 
policy perhaps with a sense that such thinking is “un-American”. Critical Europeans have 
argued that such policy is alive and well in the US hidden within vast federal programs with 
other nominal missions, such as national defense. Such debates have been most visible in the 
context of political support for the aircraft industry.   
 
Growing global awareness and action toward reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
have led the U.S. federal government to implement several initiatives to reduce federal 
energy consumption and GHG emissions.  These federal mandates have applied to the 
majority of DoD’s vast array of fixed installations in the U.S. and abroad. 
 
Additionally, US DoD concerns about its reliance on commercial networks and 
infrastructure, particularly the U.S. electricity grid, have provided further impetus for energy 
innovation at its stationary facilities.  Increasingly, fixed installations are directly engaged in 
operational missions in foreign theaters (for example through the command of unmanned 
aerial vehicles) as well as serve as local command centers for national relief and recovery 
efforts and Homeland defense missions.  However, these installations rely heavily on a U.S. 
commercial electricity grid that is increasingly vulnerable to outages due to both accidents 
and intentional physical or cyber attacks (Samaras and Willis, 2013). Current methods of 
providing back-up power to installations are highly inefficient, costly, and fragmented (DST 
2008). 
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While DoD’s combat and tactical facilities, vehicles, and systems are largely exempt from 
these federal regulations, most of the agency’s fixed installations and non-tactical vehicle 
fleets do fall under these regulations. And, in fact, they make up a very large proportion of 
federal facilities and fleets: 
• In FY 2007, the total square footage and energy consumption (1.9 billion gsf and 205 
trillion Btu, respectively) of DoD buildings subject to federal energy reduction 
requirements was more than the square footage and energy consumption of all other 
agencies combined (1.1 billion gsf and 148 trillion Btu, respectively) (FEMP FY2007 
annual report, 2010). 
• In FY 2011, DoD fleet vehicles made up 30% of federal fleet vehicles and 24% of 
federal fleet fuel consumption (GSA Federal Fleet Report 2011). 
 
 
Key requirements include: 
 
• Produce or procure 25 percent of facility energy consumption by FY2025 (10 
USC § 2911) 
• Meters capable of recording energy consumption at least hourly and providing 
data at least daily installed in all federal buildings by October 1, 2012 (EPAct 
2005). 
• A 30% reduction in energy intensity (energy consumption per gross square foot 
(gsf)) of federal buildings by FY 2015 using a FY 2003 baseline (EISA 2007, EO 
13423). 
• A 55% reduction in fossil fuel-generated energy consumption in new federal 
buildings by 2010, increasing to 100% reduction by 2030, compared to a similar 
building in FY 2003 (EISA 2007). 
• Net zero energy consumption by 2030 for new federal buildings designed in 2020 
or later (EO 13514). 
• At least 7.5% of federal electricity consumption to be sourced from renewable 
resources by FY 2013.  Renewable energy generated on-site or on other federal or 
Native American lands can receive double credit (EPAct 2005). 
 
 
Because of this, the federal mandates have initiated a flurry of activity by DoD 
component entities to develop and implement renewable energy deployment strategies, build 
institutional capacity on facility energy management, and strike partnerships with other 
federal agencies as well as private sector organizations to fund energy research & 
development projects. 
 
The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations & Environment (DUSD (I&E)) 
office is responsible for managing military installation assets and services, including 
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overseeing installation energy management programs and policies.  At the request of 
Congress, the office released in 2005 the DoD Renewable Energy Assessment Final Report, 
which detailed the results of a study conducted to assess the potential to develop renewable 
energy resources on or near military installations, along with a companion Implementation 
Plan.   
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3.  Conclusion 
Energy has always been a strategic input to warfighting, but typically viewed as a priority 
of logistics planners. Security, economic and environmental factors have recently elevated 
energy to be considered as a system-wide strategic lever in the military, which will have 
lasting and positive results for war-fighting capabilities.  
 
In this paper, we have sought to argue that there is a very long history of energy/defense 
interactions and these interactions apply in policy, strategy and tactics. Furthermore, defense 
innovation has long led to civilian technological improvements in many technological areas 
(such as perhaps most notably in aerospace) we are now on the cusp of a possible similar 
technological transfer in the domain of energy technology. Defense can lead the way for 
economic reasons as well as a result of more direct military concerns. For example, for war-
fighting in recent decades the US military has faced an extremely high fully burdened cost of 
fuel. Those very high costs favour moves to innovative approaches far earlier than would be 
seen in civilian contexts where prices and costs of traditional and established options are far 
lower. We recommend such questions for further research. The authors see these pressures in 
the defense context only growing further favouring defense-led innovation. Alongside these 
developments, the issue of anthropogenic climate change has become a major international 
concern. While this paper does not directly concern itself with the impacts of a changing 
global climate on international relations and potential conflict there are clear points of 
interaction between this paper and that literature. This paper sees how climate change policies 
are affecting not only civilian innovation but also policy and decision making in defense 
contexts (nationally and inter-governmentally, such as in UN peacekeeping).  
 
Military and defense innovations are now showing positive developments in the 
environmental area. Whether the changing nature of energy supply and use in military 
planning and tactics represents a revolution in military affairs remains an unanswered 
question, but we see the potential for a major shift emerging from the military arena where it 
may even achieve the status of a Revolution in Military Affairs. 
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In closing, we observe that there is an unhelpful separation, organizationally and 
socially, between experts involved in civilian energy policy and innovation and their 
colleagues concerned for military strategy and planning. We suggest that those concerned 
for civilian energy technology and policy should do more to consider innovations and 
potential innovations emerging from the defense sector. The advantages lie not just in 
looking at the present and the past, but also (where possible) into the future. We further 
suggest that there is a growing opportunity for a reverse flow (civilian to military) in energy 
innovation especially as one considers the greening of military operations. These 
opportunities for mutually beneficial exchange have considerable potential.   
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